Your criminal FICO score by Tonelli, Michelle
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis and Dissertation Collection
2016-09
Your criminal FICO score
Tonelli, Michelle







Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 




Thesis Advisor: Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez 
Co-Advisor: John Rollins 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB 
No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 




3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master’s thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
YOUR CRIMINAL FICO SCORE 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S)  Michelle Tonelli
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     




MONITORING  AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
       One of the more contentious uses of big data analytics in homeland security is predictive policing, 
which harnesses big data to allocate police resources, decrease crime, and increase public safety. While 
predictive analytics has long been in use to forecast human behavior, the framework has not proved to 
be a flawless undertaking. In an effort to improve outcomes of predictive policing, this thesis 
assesses two high-profile programs—the nation’s most popular credit-scoring system and a 
federal flight-risk program—to determine the greatest pitfalls inherent to programs using predictive 
analytics. The programs are assessed using what is commonly known in big data as the four Vs—
volume, velocity, variety, veracity—but with an added component of the author’s creation: verification. 
Through this framework, it became apparent that the hardest Vs for any predictive policing program 
to fulfill are veracity and verification. As the field of predictive policing expands, programs face the 
challenge of ensuring that data used for analysis is accurate and remains accurate, and that the metrics 
used to verify risk assessments are sound. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS





















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii 





Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
 
 




Attorney-Advisor, Office of General Counsel, Department of Homeland Security 
B.A., University of the South, 2005 




Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 





















Associate Chair of Instruction 
Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv 




One of the more contentious uses of big data analytics in homeland security is 
predictive policing, which harnesses big data to allocate police resources, decrease crime, 
and increase public safety. While predictive analytics has long been in use to forecast 
human behavior, the framework has not proved to be a flawless undertaking. In an effort 
to improve outcomes of predictive policing, this thesis assesses two high-profile 
programs—the nation’s most popular credit-scoring system and a federal flight-risk 
program—to determine the greatest pitfalls inherent to programs using predictive 
analytics. The programs are assessed using what is commonly known in big data as the 
four Vs—volume, velocity, variety, veracity—but with an added component of the 
author’s creation: verification. Through this framework, it became apparent that the 
hardest Vs for any predictive policing program to fulfill are veracity and verification. As 
the field of predictive policing expands, programs face the challenge of ensuring that data 
used for analysis is accurate and remains accurate, and that the metrics used to verify risk 
assessments are sound. 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT .......................................................................1 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION .........................................................................6 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN ...............................................................................6 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW .....................................................................................7 
A. PRIVACY ACT ..........................................................................................7 
B. FOURTH AMENDMENT ........................................................................9 
C. FICO..........................................................................................................10 
D. SECURE FLIGHT ...................................................................................12 
III. PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS: HOW NETFLIX LURES YOU INTO 
ANOTHER MARATHON WATCHING SESSION ........................................15 
A. DATA ........................................................................................................15 
B. ALGORITHMS........................................................................................17 
IV. PREDICTIVE POLICING: YOUR CRIMINAL FICO SCORE ...................21 
A. CREATING THE PREDICTIVE POLICING PROGRAM ...............21 
B. MEASURING THE RISK ANALYSIS .................................................24 
C. CONTROLLING THE USE OF THE RISK ANALYSIS ...................26 
V. THE FICO SCORE: HOW I DISCOVERED THAT THE CREDIT 
BUREAUS THOUGHT I WAS MARRIED TO MY DAD .............................29 
A. HISTORY OF CREDIT RISK SCORES ..............................................29 
B. LAW ..........................................................................................................31 
C. VARIETY AND VOLUME OF DATA..................................................33 
D. VERACITY OF DATA ...........................................................................34 
VI. SECURE FLIGHT: WHY YOUR FRIEND ALWAYS GETS 
PRECHECK FOR FREE ....................................................................................37 
VII. ANALYSIS: OR THE POINT OF THIS THESIS ...........................................41 
A. THE FIVE VS ..........................................................................................41 
1. Volume ..........................................................................................41 
2. Variety ...........................................................................................44 
3. Velocity..........................................................................................45 
4. Veracity .........................................................................................46 
 viii 
5. Verification ...................................................................................48 
VIII. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................53 
A. SELF-POLICING ....................................................................................53 
B. LEGAL MATTERS .................................................................................54 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................57 




LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
CAPPS Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System  
DHS  Department of Homeland Security 
DHS TRIP DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program  
FCRA  The Fair Credit Reporting Act 
FICO Fair Isaac Company 
OMB Office of Management and Budget 
PNR passenger name records  
SORN System of Records Notice 
TSA  Transportation Security Administration 
TSDB Terrorist Screening Database 
  
 x 




To use big data analytics effectively in predictive policing, a program must meet 
what has become known as the “four Vs”—volume, velocity, variety, and veracity.1 
Volume requires a large amount of data, velocity requires that the data be added and 
processed at high speeds, and variety requires that the data come from multiple sources. 
Some scholars argue that big data must also be accurate, which has become known as the 
fourth V—veracity.2 Veracity is especially important when one is attempting to predict 
how a particular person will act. Because of the high stakes involved with predictive 
policing, the author argues that programs need to apply a fifth V—verification. 
Verification requires that the predictions from the predictive program be verified as 
accurate. It is the metrics to measure how well the program works. By using the Five V’s 
as a framework, any predictive analytics system can be analyzed for accuracy and 
viability.  
This thesis uses the Five V framework to review the FICO score and Secure 
Flight programs in order to determine what, if any, shortfalls exist. Through this analysis, 
it became clear that all predictive analytics programs have difficulty fulfilling all five Vs. 
FICO is able to fulfill volume because it keeps records for every individual who has some 
form of credit, which allows FICO a strong baseline. However, Secure Flight has a weak 
baseline because it does not have the proper volume of data. FICO and Secure Flight both 
have difficulties with velocity because each program must rely on third- or fourth-party 
data providers to update their records. FICO and Secure Flight also do not fulfill variety 
because each one draws only on one type of data. FICO mostly draws on financial data 
and Secure Flight draws on data from the government. This lack of variety can  
                                                 
1 Janet Chan and Lyria Bennett Moses, “Is Big Data Challenging Criminology?,” Theoretical 
Criminology 20 (2016): 21–39. 
2 Richard Berk and Justin Bleich, “Statistical Procedures for Forecasting Criminal Behavior: A 
Criminal Assessment,” Criminology & Public Policy 12, (2013): 513–544, as quoted in Chan and Moses, 
“Is Big Data Challenging Criminology?,” 28 Theoretical Criminology 20 (2016): 21–39, stating that 
accuracy is important for big data analytics; for further discussion, see “The Four Vs of Big Data,” IBM 
Big Data & Analytics Hub, accessed Aug. 12, 2016, http://www.ibmbigdatahub.com/infographic/four-vs-
big-data.  
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undermine the predictive quality of the risk analysis once score creep—or the use of the 
risk analysis for more than its original purpose—begins. Both FICO and Secure Flight 
already have seen score creep, and it is clear that score creep is a phenomenon that all 
predictive analytics programs must anticipate.   
Finally, the author reviewed the programs using the two Vs that are the hardest to 
fulfill—veracity and verification. Even harnessing data that is fully transparent, FICO 
still has difficulty maintaining accurate records. Secure Flight also is unable to maintain 
fully accurate data. For both systems, one of the main problems with the veracity of the 
data is the ineffective redress programs that both rely on to fix inaccurate data. In 
addition, Secure Flight does not have reliable metrics because it is difficult to know if 
someone was a lesser risk than the algorithm predicted. In contrast, FICO does have 
reliable metrics to measure the accuracy of its risk assessments because it is easy to track 
whether someone does or does not pay back their credit. 
Through this analysis, it is apparent that other predictive policing programs will 
have many of the problems inherent to the Secure Flight program because of the 
difficulties in defining a proper baseline, correcting inaccurate data, and verifying the 
prediction. In order to have a proper baseline to predict whom within a society will 
commit crime, police departments will need to collect information on every citizen, much 
like FICO. This, of course, is rife with privacy concerns as well as civil rights and civil 
liberties issues. In order for predictive policing programs to avoid the same issues as 
Secure Flight, they must create and maintain viable and effective redress programs that 
allow citizens to question and correct the data that the programs utilize.  
Ultimately, predictive policing programs must find accurate metrics. Most 
programs rely on crime rates as the metric to measure success; however, dropping crime 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
One of the more contentious uses of big data analytics in homeland security is 
predictive policing, which harnesses big data to better allocate police resources, decrease 
crime, and increase public safety. It is a tool “that develops and uses information and 
advanced analysis to inform forward-thinking crime prevention.”1  
Predictive policing began by predicting crime locations by relying on crime 
statistics and other data.2 By analyzing the data, predictive policing models forecast 
where there might be an increase in certain types of crimes—especially property-related 
crimes.3 Recently, however, law enforcement has begun to use predictive policing to 
assist in predicting which individuals may be likely to commit criminal activities,4 
essentially giving individuals a FICO score for how likely they are to commit a crime 
rather than how likely they are to pay back a loan. This expansion in predictive policing 
and the world of opportunity that comes with it has piqued the interest of homeland 
security experts, who hope that big data can be used to predict human behavior. 
However, predicting human behavior is rife with difficulty.  
Government attempts to collect large amounts of data on American citizens is not 
revolutionary. The government has sought to collect data on Americans since the first 
Census on August 2, 1790.5 In fact, data has been used for public safety efforts since the 
1800s, when Dr. John Snow mapped cholera clusters in London that showed how the 
                                                 
1 Craig D. Uchida, A National Discussion on Predictive Policing: Defining Our Terms and Mapping 
Successful Implementation Strategies, (Report No. NCJ 230404) (Washington, DC: National Institute of 
Justice, 2009): 1. 
2 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, “Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion,” Emory Law Journal 62 
(2012): 259, 265. 
3 Nate Berg, “Predicting Crime—LAPD Style,” Guardian, June 25, 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/jun/25/predicting-crime-lapd-los-angeles-police-data-analysis-
algorithm-minority-report. 
4 Ferguson, “Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion,” 266.  




disease spread and opened the door to improved medical techniques.6 What is 
revolutionary about modern-day data collection is the amount of data that is collected and 
stored, and the increased computational capacity by both government and private entities 
to aggregate and analyze the data about each individual.  
Technological advances have made it easy and inexpensive to create, collect, 
store, and analyze all types of data. It is estimated that in 2019, it will take “an individual 
more than five million years to watch the amount of video that will cross global [internet 
protocol (IP)] networks each month.”7 Furthermore, as the growth of the “internet of 
things”8 continues, so does the amount of accessible personal data available for analysis.9  
This profusion of data will continue to span a wide spectrum. Some of that data will be 
about the mundane trivialities of life—what time your coffee maker is set to start—to 
very personal data—what time you remind yourself to take certain medications.10 It is 
these technological breakthroughs in big data analytics that law enforcement departments 
hope to harness through predictive policing programs. 
For some departments, that hope has already been realized. For example, the 
Chicago Police Department used predictive policing to assemble a list of roughly 400 
individuals who are likely to be involved in violent crime.11 The “heat list,” as the 
Chicago Police Department calls it, is compiled by using data points that included 
                                                 
6 John Podesta et al., Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values (Washington, DC: Executive 
Office of the President, May 2014). 
7 “The Zettabyte Era—Trends and Analysis,” Cisco, June 2016, http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/
solutions/collateral/service-provider/visual-networking-index-vni/VNI_Hyperconnectivity_WP.html. 
8 Jacob Morgan, “A Simple Explanation of ‘The Internet of Things,’” Forbes, May 13, 2014, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-internet-things-that-anyone-can-
understand/#15c4d0d16828.The Internet of things (IoT) is the concept of connecting any type of electronic 
device to the internet. This allows for a significant increase in the number of devices that can collect 
information about individual’s daily moments. 
9 “United States of Emoji,” SwiftKey, accessed Aug. 31, 2016, http://swiftkey.com/en/united-states-
emoji/#. Big data analytics can even predict which emoji you are more likely to use based on your 
geography. 
10 Podesta, Big Data, 2.  
11 Ibid., 31.  
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information about individuals’ criminal records, social circles, and gang connections.12  
Police officers then use the heat list to visit the individuals and warn them that they were 
being closely watched.13 Similarly, Kansas City, Missouri, began the Kansas City No 
Violence Alliance, which also uses predictive policing to forecast individuals who are 
likely to commit violent crimes. Those individuals are also asked to attend a meeting in 
which they are told they are being watched by law enforcement and that “the next time 
they, or anyone in their crews, commit a violent act, the police will come after everyone 
in the group for whatever offense they can make stick, no matter how petty.”14   
Additionally, police officers in Philadelphia predict which parolees are more 
likely to be recidivists.15 The Philadelphia program uses big data analytics in order to 
assess each new parolee as a low-risk, moderate-risk, or high-risk case.16 Through this 
model, Philadelphia has been able to allocate the correct amount of resources for each 
case.17 The Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services has also begun 
testing the use predictive policing to determine which children in its care are at a higher 
risk of suffering abuse. Like the Philadelphia parole program, the hope is that 
overworked social workers can more easily identify the urgent cases and focus their time 
and energy on those cases.18  
These four programs focus on improving resource allocation, but they also bring 
significant implications for civil rights and liberties. Each program makes risk 
                                                 
12John Eligon and Timothy Williams, “Police Program Aims to Pinpoint Those Most Likely to Commit 
Crimes,” New York Times, Sept. 25, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/us/police-program-aims-
to-pinpoint-those-most-likely-to-commit-crimes.html?_r=0. 
13 Michael Thomsen, “Predictive Policing and the Fantasy of Declining Violence in America,” Forbes, 
June 30, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelthomsen/2014/06/30/predictive-policing-and-the-
fantasy-of-declining-violence-in-america/#353047606931. 
14 Eligon and Williams, “On Police Radar for Crimes They Might Commit.” 
15 Ibid. 
16 Nancy Ritter, “Predicting Recidivism Risk: New Tool in Philadelphia Shows Great Promise,” 
National Institute of Justice Journal, 271(February 2013), http://www.nij.gov/journals/271/pages/
predicting-recidivism.aspx. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Andrea Gardner, “Can an Algorithm Predict Child Abuse? L.A. County Child Welfare Officials Are 
Trying to Find Out,” Southern California Public Radio, January 13, 2015, http://www.scpr.org/news/2015/
01/13/49191/can-an-algorithm-predict-child-abuse-la-county-chi/.  
 4 
assessments about individuals, and those assessments are used to determine how to treat 
that individual. If the Chicago or Kansas City programs incorrectly forecast someone as a 
potential violent offender, then that person is closely monitored by the police for no 
reason. This wastes law enforcement resources as well as encroaches upon the civil rights 
and civil liberties of the individual. If the Los Angeles program incorrectly predicts that a 
child will be abused, then the families that receive higher scrutiny could face needless 
upheaval, which could have serious negative effects on the child’s welfare. As with most 
tools, there are benefits, and there are detriments. The key is to ensure that the correct 
balance is struck.    
In order to uphold accuracy, big data analytics often rely on the “four Vs”—
volume, velocity, variety, and veracity.19 Volume requires a large amount of data, 
velocity requires that the data be added and processed at high speeds, and variety requires 
that the data come from multiple sources. Some authors argue that big data must also be 
accurate, which has become known as the fourth V, veracity.20 It becomes apparent that 
veracity is especially important when attempting to predict how a particular person will 
act. Given the significant implications of predicting human behavior, I argue that a fifth 
V should be added—verification. Thus, in order for a big data program to succeed, the 
five Vs must be met.  
Understanding the type of data relied upon by the algorithm is important, 
especially given that the datasets relied on are often from third- and fourth-party 
providers.21 Not all data is the same, thus where a predictive policing program procures 
the data is important. Without understanding the type of data and where the data comes 
from, predictive policing programs cannot ensure the veracity of the data used, nor can 
                                                 
19 Chan and Moses, “Is Big Data Challenging Criminology?,” 21, 24. 
20 Berk and Bleich, “Statistical Procedures for Forecasting Criminal Behavior,” 513–544, as quoted in 
Chan and Moses, “Is Big Data Challenging Criminology?,” 28, stating that accuracy is important for big 
data analytics; for further discussion, see “The Four Vs of Big Data,” IBM Big Data &Analytics Hub, 
accessed Aug. 12, 2016, http://www.ibmbigdatahub.com/infographic/four-vs-big-data. 
21 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, “Big Data Distortions: Exploring the Limits of the ABA LEATPR 
Standards,” Oklahoma Law Review 66 (2014): 831–874. 
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they ensure that the combination of datasets produce accurate results.22 By using the data 
collected by third or fourth parties, it may also be difficult to secure corrections to 
inaccurate information.  
The Privacy Act of 1974 requires that the federal government reasonably ensure 
that the data it collects is correct and permits individuals to petition the federal 
government to correct inaccurate records.23 However, even the Privacy Act has large 
gaps. In order for someone to seek a correction to his or her data, the individual must 
know what data the government has about them. Even with System of Records Notices 
(SORN), which describes federal data records, it can be difficult for individuals to know 
the sources and the type of data on file with the federal government. Additionally, unlike 
the federal government, which, in most cases, must publish a SORN private entities and 
states do not necessarily have the same requirement. This makes it significantly harder 
for individuals to correct their records. Thus, the onus to ensure accurate data falls on the 
predictive policing program, as the data steward, and the program should constantly 
check its records even though there is no legal requirement to do so. Continual updates to 
data will ensure that the data is accurate, and thus, that the predictions made are true.  
For the most part, researchers tend to focus on the use of the analytics by the end 
user, which can be government entities, private entities, or individuals. Although an end 
user incorrectly using the prediction is troubling, sometimes the incorrect use is caused 
by a lack of understanding of the predictive analytics program.24 Misuse also can come 
when a program does not properly verify the risk assessment—what I propose should be 
the fifth V. In order to protect civil rights and liberties and to ensure privacy, there should 
be guidelines for law enforcement to rely on when deciding how to use the risk 
assessments created by predictive policing. Additionally, there should be clear metrics to 
verify that the predictive policing program creates accurate risk assessments. By creating 
solid guidelines that incorporate the five Vs, law enforcement can ensure that the 
                                                 
22 Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Jan. 
28, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2208240. 
23 The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1974). 
24 Chan and Moses, “Is Big Data Challenging Criminology?,” 32; State v. Loomis, 2016 WL 3704814, 
(Supreme Court of Wisconsin 2016). 
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predictive policing programs do not harm civil rights and liberties, nor waste police 
resources.  
Luckily, predictive policing is not the government’s or private companies’ first 
attempt to use predictive analytics to predict human behavior. Credit rating agencies, 
through FICO scores, use big data analytics to predict who will repay their loans. More 
recently, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) started tapping big data 
analytics in its attempts to predict who will be low-risk airline passengers. Predictive 
policing can learn from the mistakes and successes of these two programs.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the challenges of adopting effective predictive policing technologies and 
policies that provide benefits to law enforcement while protecting the privacy and civil 
rights and liberties of individuals? 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research harnesses a combination of legal review and case studies. First, I 
review the current legal environment within the United States for predictive analytics 
programs, in order to understand how these laws, regulations, and guidelines will apply to 
a predictive policing program. Next, I will perform a case study by reviewing the Secure 
Flight and FICO score programs. By analyzing the common pitfalls of these programs 
and applying them to predictive policing, potential problems can be avoided.  
 7 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are several federal laws that cover how data can be collected, and then once 
collected, used, by the federal government.25 However, there are very few laws that 
dictate how a program that relies on big data analytics should create its database or use 
the predictions.  
A. PRIVACY ACT 
Federal agencies must follow the requirements of the Privacy Act when collecting 
or storing data. The Privacy Act lays out the requirements that each agency must follow 
when maintaining a system of records. Because any system relied upon for predictive 
policing programs would be a system of record, the federal agency will need to follow all 
12 requirements, unless the database is exempted from the requirements. This literature 
review will discuss only the requirements that most directly affect big data collection. 
5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) requires agencies to “maintain in its records only such 
information about an individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of 
the agency.”26 What is relevant and necessary will depend on the particular agency’s 
statutory authorities.27 Thus, the reasons to collect data can be broad, especially if the 
program’s mission is to predict future crime. Any information that would be necessary 
and relevant to accurately predict who will commit crime could be included in a 
predictive policing program.  
5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5)28 requires agencies to maintain the records with “such 
accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure 
                                                 
25 I chose not to include the Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-ee3 
because it only requires federal agencies to report their data mining activities to Congress; it does not 
control, condition, or limit those activities. 
26 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1). 
27 Reuber v. United States, 829 F.2d 133, 139–140 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  
28 Note 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5) is one of the sections in which the head of an agency may exempt a 
system of records from adhering to its requirements. This exemption is only available to the Central 
Intelligence Agency or other agency that performs “as its principal function any activity pertaining to the 
enforcement of criminal laws.” For further discussion, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j). 
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fairness to the individual in the determination.”29 This section does not require perfection, 
instead the courts created a reasonable standard for agencies to follow.30 As the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted, “the Privacy Act merely requires an agency to 
attempt to keep accurate records, and provides a remedy to a claimant who demonstrates 
that facts underlying judgments contained in his records have been discredited.”31 Thus, 
an agency must take reasonable measures to ensure the accuracy of the data maintained in 
the database. 
5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) requires that an agency does not maintain any records 
“describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment 
unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual … or pertinent to … an 
authorized law enforcement activity.”32 The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
guidance on the Privacy Act encourages agencies to use a broad, reasonable 
interpretation as to what types of activities constitute exercising a right under the First 
Amendment.33 This is extremely important to understand when creating a predictive 
analytics database. Often surveillance can include information on an individual’s 
religious beliefs, political beliefs, and associations.34 
5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(9) and (10) require that agencies establish “rules of conduct 
for persons involved in the design, development, operation, or maintenance”35 of the 
system of records and “establish appropriate administrative, technical, and physical 
safeguards to insure the security and confidentiality of records.”36 This pertains to 
records that are leaked or hacked. The legal liability under this section could mean a class 
                                                 
29 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5). 
30 Johnston v. Horne 875 F.2d 1415, 1421 (9th Cir. 1989). 
31 Debold v. Stimson, 735 F.3d 1037, 1040–41 (7th Cir. 1984).  
32 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7). Unlike 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5), this section cannot be exempted under 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a(j). 
33 40 Fed. Reg. 28,965 (July 9, 1975). 
34 Maydak v. U.S., 363 F.3d 512, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2004), finding “it obvious that photographs of 
prisoners visiting with family, friends, and associates depict the exercise of associational rights protected 
by the First Amendment.” 
35 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(9). 
36 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(10). 
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action lawsuit of individuals harmed by any unintentional release of records and could be 
costly for the agency. Thus, cybersecurity concerns should be treated seriously. 
Along with statutes, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued several 
memoranda to guide federal agencies in the sharing and use of data. OMB published the 
memoranda in response to Executive Order 13,642 and, like the executive order, it 
encourages interoperability and openness. However, the memoranda also encourages the 
protection of the data and assurance that data is collected and used only when necessary 
and relevant to achieve an agency’s missions. 
The OMB memorandum that is most relevant is the “Guidance for Providing and 
Using Administrative Data for Statistical Purposes” because predictive analytics 
programs at their core are statistics-based programs. Generally, the memorandum 
requires statistical agencies to be good data stewards, appropriately managing data 
through its life cycle, entering into interagency agreements before accepting the data, and 
protecting its privacy.37 
B. FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The rise of predictive analytics will have a several effects on Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. First, more information will be collected on individuals in police 
databases, and those individuals may not receive notice of the collection.38 Without 
notice, individuals will never have the ability to challenge the collection and 
dissemination of their information or have the opportunity to correct potentially 
erroneous data. Notice is a foundational element to the Fourth Amendment. Before the 
rise of electronic searches, notice was a given because individuals tend to notice when 
their homes, personal effects, and persons are being physically searched.39 Now, 
                                                 
37 Office of Management and Budget, “Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Their Agencies: Guidance for Providing and Using Administrative Data for Statistical Purposes” (M-14-
06), Feb. 14, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2014/m-14-06.pdf.  
38 Patrick Toomey and Brett Max Kaufman, “The Notice Paradox: Secrete Surveillance, Criminal 
Defendants & the Right to Notice,” Santa Clara Law Review 54 (2014): 843–900. 
39 Ibid. 
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however, a person may never realize that the government searched or seized their 
electronic files.40 
Furthermore, predictive analytics may change a police officer’s or judge’s 
evaluation of reasonable suspicion and probable cause. Both reasonable suspicion and 
probable cause rely on the analysis of the totality of the circumstances. As predictive 
analytics begins to predict who is more likely to commit a crime, the predictions could 
become an element in a totality-of-the-circumstances evaluation.41 Thus, the analysis will 
depend on the datasets that are included in the database. For example, if the database 
relies on past criminal record, current neighborhood, groups the person joins, and schools 
attended for an evaluation, the analysis will begin to rely on information that police and 
courts have rarely been able to use before to determine reasonable suspicion. Instead of 
analyzing just the circumstances of the situation at hand, a person’s entire background 
will also be a factor, for the first time. Therefore, fully understanding and scrutinizing the 
types of data that are included in the databases will be incredibly important to the 
protection of constitutional rights.  
C. FICO 
The Fair Isaac Corporation was founded in 1956 and provided one of the first 
analytic solutions for credit ratings.42 The FICO score algorithm is a secret, like most 
predictive analytic programs, and is relied upon by the three major U.S. credit agencies, 
Experian, Equifax, and Transunion.43 Most individuals understand that their credit 
worthiness is based on their FICO score; however, many Americans are surprised when 
their FICO score is also used to determine their status in other areas of their life. For 
instance, many employers use the FICO score to screen applicants and help assess 
whether he or she will be a good employee, and insurance companies use FICO scores to 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, “Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion,” University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 163 (2015): 327–428; Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, “Predictive Policing and 
Reasonable Suspicion,” Emory Law Review 62 (2012): 259. 
42 “FICO at a Glance,” FICO, accessed Feb. 6, 2016, http://www.fico.com/en/about-us#at_glance. 
43 Shweta Arya, Catherine Eckel, and Colin Wichman, “Anatomy of the Credit Score,” Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization 95 (2013): 175–185. 
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determine insurance rates.44 There is even an online dating website that primarily relies 
upon an individual’s credit score to determine whether the person will be a good life 
partner.45 Thus, what started as an instrument to help banks determine creditworthiness 
became a tool used to assess and define much more about a person.   
As with most tools, FICO’s has both supporters and detractors. In “Anatomy of 
the Credit Score,” Arya, Eckel, and Wichman summarize much of the literature that 
determines that FICO Scores correlate to trustworthiness, patience, and loan repayment.46 
They also, through their own work, suggest that credit scores correlate to “impulsivity, 
time preference (or future orientation), and trustworthiness.”47 Thus, FICO can be used as 
an accurate indicator of certain human characteristics.   
However, many studies also suggest that U.S. credit bureaus contain significant 
errors. For example, Smith et al. summarize the literature that expresses doubts about 
FICO scores’ accuracy.48 In the same paper, they also conducted a study that sampled 
1,000 U.S. consumers and reviewed their credit reports from the three bureaus. Out of 
those records studied, 26% included at least one material error.49 An interesting aspect of 
their study is that they also followed those individuals as they attempted to correct the 
errors. Only 78% of those individuals were able to get at least one bureau to alter their 
credit rating.50 These alterations often made significant differences to the credit scores. 
The authors’ concluded that credit scores can be a good indicator of creditworthiness, but 
only if consumers are vigilant to ensure that the data included in their score is accurate.51 
                                                 
44 Ibid.; for further discussion, see Bernerth et al., “An Empirical Investigation of Dispositional 
Antecedents and Performance-Related Outcomes of Credit Scores,” Journal of Applied Psychology 97, 
(2012): 469–478, studying whether FICO scores should be used as an employment indicator. 
45 “About,” Credit Score Dating, accessed Feb. 6, 2016, http://creditscoredating.com/. 
46 Arya, Eckel and Wichman, “Anatomy of the Credit Score,” 176. 
47 Ibid., 184.  
48 Smith et al., “Accuracy of Information Maintained by U.S. Credit Bureaus: Frequency of Errors and 
Effects on Consumers’ Credit Scores,” The Journal of Consumer Affairs (Fall 2013): 589–590. 
49 Ibid., 593. 
50 Ibid., 594, 600, noting that because consumers had the assistance of the researchers in filing their 
disputes, the participants in this study may have had more success than other consumers. 
51 Ibid., 600. 
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D. SECURE FLIGHT 
Secure Flight began in 2009 to identify airline passengers who posed a high 
security risk by comparing passenger lists against federal government watch lists.52 In 
2011, the program expanded to include lists of pre-approved low-risk travelers, such as 
those in the Transportation Security Administration Precheck program. Secure Flight’s 
objective eventually evolved to include risk analysis for individuals on a per-flight basis 
to determine their general risk to aviation security. The risk assessment is determined 
from passenger name records (PNR), government watch lists, such as the No Fly List and 
the Terrorist Screening Database, and other databases. All data is destroyed within seven 
days of the flight and is only kept if a passenger complains that he or she was wrongly 
identified under the system.53       
Even after a few years in operation, the possibility of being wrongly identified by 
the system is possible. At least two of the databases that the Secure Flight program 
accesses, the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) and the No Fly List, have struggled 
with the accuracy of data. Not only have the databases struggled with delivering 
accuracy, but the programs have also struggled with creating an effective redress 
program. The recent litigation surrounding the No Fly List highlights the lack of 
constitutionally required due process for both databases.54 Thus, a significant issue to 
consider when creating a predictive policing program is the proper redress for individuals 
who are incorrectly included. To achieve this will be difficult because, much like the 
Secure Flight program, full transparency could jeopardize ongoing law enforcement 
investigations. Consequently, learning from the mistakes made with TSDB and the No 
Fly List could prevent wasted police resources, increase community trust, and ensure that 
civil rights and civil liberties are effectively protected. This issue also points to a problem 
with the common practice of relying on third- or fourth-party data providers because it is 
                                                 
52 Government Accountability Office (GAO), TSA Has Taken Steps to Improve Oversight of Key 
Program, but Additional Actions Are Needed (GAO-15-559T) (Washington, DC: GAO, May 13, 2015), 3.  
53 “DHS/TSA-019 Secure Flight Records System of Records,” 233, 238. 
54 Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp 3d 1134, 1161–62 (D. Or. 2014), finding the TSA redress procedures did 
not meet the constitutional for due process; Ibrahim v. Dept. of Homeland Security, 62 F. Supp. 3d 909, 
931(D. N. Ca. 2014), finding that TSA did not provide constitutional due process to plaintiff. 
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extremely difficult to ensure accuracy and whether providers have procedures to permit 
people to correct inaccurate data. 
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III. PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS: 
HOW NETFLIX LURES YOU INTO ANOTHER MARATHON 
WATCHING SESSION 
The basic definition of predictive analytics is “technology that learns from 
experience (data) to predict the future behavior of individuals in order to drive better 
decisions.”55 Prior to big data analytics, most statistical forecasts were made based on 
samples. Today, however, massive amounts of data are collected on individuals every 
day, so scientists, businesses, and government can make forecasts based on extremely 
large amounts of data. Analytics have improved because the forecasts are no longer based 
on small samples but on the analysis of an entire universe of data.  
In a fundamental sense, predictive analytics relies on an algorithm (written by 
humans) to learn from data (collected from humans), to predict actions (of humans). As 
anyone who has lost a thesis by inadvertently striking a wrong key during a late night 
writing session can confirm, sometimes the weakest point of any software program is 
human involvement. Thus, the weakest part of the predictive analytics program is in the 
data and the algorithm. If the collected data is wrong, out of date, or illegible to the 
program, then that data will lead to the wrong prediction. If the technician writing the 
algorithm makes the wrong assumptions or puts too little or too much weight on certain 
data, then the algorithm will make a wrong prediction. 
A. DATA 
Predictive analytics programs are able to search for connections, or needles in the 
haystack, (formally known as statistically significant anomalies or variations), that 
scientific and human analysis were unable to find before the ability to analyze each piece 
of hay.56 However, in order for this to work, the predictive analytics program must 
collect the whole haystack (formally known as the baseline). If the predictive analytics 
program relies on too little data, then it runs into the same problems that sampling runs 
                                                 
55 Eric Siegel, Predictive Analytics: The Power to Predict Who Will Click, Buy, Lie, or Die (Hoboken, 
NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2016), 14. 
56 Siegel, Predictive Analytics, 87. 
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into. Even so, just having the haystack does not equate to a perfect prediction. The type 
of data used in predictive analytics requires what has become known as the three Vs—
volume, velocity, and variety.57 Volume requires a large amount of data, velocity 
requires that the data be added and processed at high speeds, and variety requires that the 
data be from multiple sources. Some authors argue that data must also be accurate, which 
has become known as the fourth V—veracity.58 Therefore, in order for a predictive 
analytics program to succeed, at the very least, the four Vs must be met.   
Volume, as mentioned above, is about collecting the whole haystack, and there 
can be significant concerns about this collection. The data that is collected about 
individuals and sold for about a half a cent, describes some of an individual’s most 
intimate decisions.59  Predictive analytics can predict employees who will quit their jobs, 
what ads consumers are likely to click on, which insured person is most apt to die, and 
whether a woman is pregnant.60 These predictions come from collections of data from 
both the government and private companies. Because of this, there is a negative gut 
reaction to the idea that the police will collect significant amounts of data on all citizens. 
Nonetheless, in order for a predictive analytics program to be able to recognize that 
something is a needle as opposed to a piece of straw, it must have the entire haystack to 
analyze. The anomalies, or the needle, only become apparent when the algorithm 
understands what is the normal baseline.61  
This same analysis can be applied to the second V—variety. If a predictive 
program does not have enough variety of data, then the analysis will not be accurate. To 
continue the beleaguered analogy, the predictive program needs to know what every type 
                                                 
57 Chan and Moses, “Is Big Data Challenging Criminology?,” 21, 24. 
58 Berk and Bleich, “Statistical Procedures for Forecasting Criminal Behavior,” as quoted in Chan and 
Moses, “Is Big Data Challenging Criminology?,” 28, stating that accuracy is important for big data 
analytics; see also “The Four Vs of Big Data” http://www.ibmbigdatahub.com/infographic/four-vs-big-
data. 
59 Alexis Madrigal, “How Much Is Your Data Worth? Mmm, Somewhere between Half a Cent and 
$1,200,” Atlantic, March 19, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/how-much-is-
your-data-worth-mmm-somewhere-between-half-a-cent-and-1-200/254730/. 
60 For more information, see Siegel, Predictive Analytics.  
61 Siegel, Predictive Analytics, 87. 
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of straw could possibly look like in order to tell when something is not a straw. It also 
needs to know what all needles look like in order to tell if something is just a bug. 
Conversely, there is a possibility of using too many data points.62 Thus, the art of 
predictive analysis is finding the point when the variety of data points maximizes the 
analysis because too little or too many will cause bad predictions. 
Stale data creates stale predictions. As such, the velocity in which the data is 
updated is extremely important to a predictive analytics program.63 This also affects the 
accuracy, or veracity, of the data, the fourth V. Understanding the type of data relied 
upon by the algorithm is also important, especially given that the datasets relied on are 
often from third- and even fourth-party providers.64 Without this understanding, 
predictive policing programs cannot ensure the veracity of the data used nor can they 
ensure that the combination of datasets produce accurate and not discriminatory results.65 
By using the data collected by third or fourth parties, it will also be difficult for the 
programs to correct inaccurate information. 
B. ALGORITHMS 
Algorithms are incredibly powerful tools and the people who write the code have 
an awesome responsibility. Algorithms are so powerful that they have entered the 
political realm, as is indicated by a conference in June 2016 that was dedicated solely to 
the politics of algorithms.66 As Gillespie explains, algorithms should not be viewed only 
as technological achievements, rather we “must unpack the warm human and institutional 
                                                 
62 Siegel, Predictive Analytics, 143. 
63 Ying Lie, “Big Data and Predictive Business Analytics,” Journal of Business Forecasting (Winter 
2014–2015): 40–42. 
64 Ferguson, “Big Data Distortions,” 66. 
65 Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, 34–35. 
66 “Preconference Call for Papers: Algorithms, Automation and Politics” International Communication 
Association, accessed Aug. 2, 2016, http://www.icahdq.org/conf/2016/AlgorithmsCFP.asp; for further 
discussion, see also Project Bots, A Project Algorithms, Computational Propaganda, and Digital Politics, 
http://www.politicalbots.com/. 
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choices that lie behind these cold mechanisms.”67 Take, for example, Google’s search 
code. It determines what hits you see when you search for something to cook for dinner 
or when you google the name of your date from that credit score dating website. With 
one stroke of the button, though, Google can change what information comes up top and 
what information becomes your 100th hit. Google has, in fact, done this when it decided 
to down-weight (or de-emphasize) any hits that came from mug shot websites.68 Now, a 
potential date’s mug shot will not be one of the first hits that surfaces when a dating 
hopeful conducts a search before deciding whether to accept an invitation for drinks.  
Inherent in every algorithm are criteria that are used to rank the data. These 
criteria “essentially embed a set of choices and value propositions that determine what 
gets pushed to the top of the ranking.”69  These choices are a type of 21st century art. The 
programmers make significant choices when creating their algorithms including the type 
of data analyzed, the weight in the algorithm that each data set receives, and the 
acceptable level of false negatives and positives. Thus, their subconscious assumptions 
and biases can greatly affect the predictive outcome.70 Often, though, the value 
determinations are not readily available to the public. Hence, society never gets to 
determine whether the value determinations made by a handful of programmers fit the 
values of that society. Take Google’s decision to down-weight mugshots in their search 
algorithm. Google determined that the privacy of an arrestee who may never have been 
convicted outweighs the curiosity about one’s neighbors. It is a value judgment. This is 
even more troubling for algorithms used by governments to predict the actions of citizens 
and thus determine how the government will treat that citizen. 
                                                 
67 Tarleton Gillespie, “The Relevance of Algorithms,” in Media Technologies: Essays on 
Communication, Materiality, and Society, eds. Tarleton Gillespie, Pablo Boczkowski, and Kirsten Foot 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014). http://mixedrealitycity.org/readings/
Gillespie_TheRelevanceofAlgorithms.pdf. 
68 Nicholas Diakopoulos, Algorithmic Accountability Reporting: On the Investigation of Black Boxes 
(New York: Columbia Journalism School, Tow Center for Digital Journalism, Dec. 3, 2014), 2, 
http://towcenter.org/research/algorithmic-accountability-on-the-investigation-of-black-boxes-2/. 
69 Diakopoulos, Algorithmic Accountability Reporting, 5. 
70 Tal Z. Zarksy, “Transparent Predictions,” University of Illinois Law Review (2013): 1503, 1517–
1518. 
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It is because of this awesome power that the Vs of predictive analytics should not 
just cover the big data used. Rather, there should be a fifth V—verification. Verification 
requires that the prediction be verified as accurate. It verifies that the mixture of data 
chosen and the value judgments of the algorithm create an accurate prediction. This is 
usually accomplished through a two-step process.71 A set of data with a known output is 
split into a training set and a testing set. The training set is used to train the algorithm. 
The algorithm then analyzes the testing set, and if all goes well, the algorithm makes the 
correct prediction. However, even after this initial testing, the algorithm must be 
continually tested to ensure that it has not gone stale.72  
The continued testing of some predictive analytics programs is rather simple. 
When predictive analytics is used to forecast whether a consumer is pregnant, there is a 
way to verify that guess when the consumer begins buying diapers in nine months. You 
know if the Netflix algorithm is off when you have no desire to watch any of the shows it 
recommends. When the FICO score predicts the likelihood that someone will not default 
on a loan, the prediction is tested by tracking whether the individual fulfills his or her 
financial obligations. However, predictive policing is attempting to predict a negative, 
and that is difficult to verify.73  For example, if a predictive policing program predicts 
that an individual will commit crimes once released from prison, and the government 
does not release the convict, the program’s guess cannot be verified. It is not hard to 
imagine the scene from 1984 when Parsons is thrown into prison with Winston. Parson 
states that he is an agent of Goldstein, but he did not know it.74  
Managing all of these issues is not easy. Finding the right balance of volume, 
variety, and velocity is an art. Ensuring the veracity of data and verifying the predictions 
is time consuming. Furthermore, in some instances, it is impossible to verify the 
                                                 
71 Perry et al., Predictive Policing: The Role of Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement Operations 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 41. 
72 Perry et al., Predictive Policing, 13. 
73 Siegel, Predictive Analytics, 70. 
74 George Orwell, 1984 (New York: Signet Classics, 1949), 232–34. 
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prediction, which limits one of the most important aspects of predictive analytics—
machine learning.  
This balance is especially difficult for predictive policing programs. Determining 
which datasets to use to predict who will commit a crime means deciding which theories 
regarding criminal behavior to follow. After determining which datasets to include, the 
coder must determine which datasets are more likely to predict who will be a criminal 
and ensure that the algorithm weighs that factor more than the others. The coder must 
somehow create concrete metrics to verify that the predictions are correct. Finally, the 
accuracy and completeness of the data must be maintained and the predictions 
continually tested to ensure the algorithm has not gone awry. Obviously, creating the 
criminal FICO score is not a simple proposition. 
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IV. PREDICTIVE POLICING: YOUR CRIMINAL FICO SCORE 
A. CREATING THE PREDICTIVE POLICING PROGRAM 
Predictive policing has been defined broadly by the National Institute of Justice as 
“any policing strategy or tactic that develops and uses information and advanced analysis 
to inform forward-thinking crime prevention.”75 Predictive policing can be as simple as 
heuristic methods to complicated predictive analytics.76 The goal for any predictive 
policing program is to prevent crime by predicting where crime is likely to occur or who 
is likely to commit crime. Thus, the specific goal of the program will affect which 
predictive analytics methods are chosen.77 The goal of the first-generation predictive 
policing programs was simply to determine where crime was most likely to be 
committed. Today, cutting-edge predictive policing programs ask who is likely to be 
involved in crimes. Those are very different goals with very different methodologies.   
After determining the goal of a predictive policing program, the algorithm must 
be created.78 The algorithm and the methods used to create the algorithm will depend on 
the amount and type of data, the question, and the resources of the particular police 
department.79 The method can be as simple as data mining and geomapping to as 
complicated as social networking analysis.80 The bottom line, though, is that each 
method’s goal is to predict human behavior.    
After choosing the method to be used, the programmer determines what data is 
needed and how it should be collected. This is not an easy process for police departments, 
analytics experts, or computer programmers. As the internet of Things grows, 
                                                 
75 Uchida, A National Discussion on Predictive Policing, 1. 
76 Perry et al., Predictive Policing, 17–55. For this thesis, I narrow the focus to the predictive policing 
programs that involve predictive analytics. 
77 Siegel, Predictive Analytics, 24. 
78 For a comprehensive review of the various forms of predictive analytics, see Predictive Policing by 
Perry et al. For the purposes of this thesis, it is enough to know that there are several methodologies that 
can be used by a predictive policing program. 
79 Perry et al., Predictive Policing, 11–15. 
80 Ibid., 101–107. 
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departments have more and more data from which to choose.81  In fact, third-party data 
providers continue to grow as data providers for law enforcement.82  This data can be 
defined as open source, such as the information found on Twitter,83 or it can be more 
sensitive, such as data from financial records.84   
Thus, the programmer has a wealth of data from which to choose and must 
determine what data will and will not be used by the algorithm. Most investigatory 
information will come directly from the police department.85  However, information 
about demographics and other environmental data will come from third- or fourth-party 
vendors.86 Not only does the programmer need to choose which data to use, but the 
programmer must also assess the accuracy of that data. Data obtained directly from a 
police department or a third or fourth party has the possibility of including significant 
errors.87 An error can be caused by case notes that were not properly translated into 
machine-readable data or by incorrect or stale data.88 A police officer might think Bob 
and Susie are dating when in reality, Bob is dating Susie’s friend, Jane. Or, the case notes 
were not updated to reflect that Bob is now dating Linda, and Jane and Susie are no 
longer friends with Bob or Linda. All are easy mistakes to make, but these mistakes will 
cause the predictive algorithm to make incorrect predictions. Third- and fourth-party data 
providers experience similar issues, but these are harder to correct because the source of 
the data is not always known. 
                                                 
81 Morgan, “A Simple Explanation.” The Internet of things (IoT) is the concept of connecting any type 
of electronic device to the internet. This allows for a significant increase in the number of devices that can 
collect information about individual’s daily moments. 
82 Stephanie K. Pell, “Systematic Government Access to Private-Sector Data in the United States,” 
International Data Privacy Law 2 (2012): 245. 
83 Christopher S. Stewart and Mark Maremont, “Twitter Bars Intelligence Agencies from Using 
Analytics Service,” Wall Street Journal, May 8, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/twitter-bars-
intelligence-agencies-from-using-analytics-service-1462751682. 
84 Pell, “Systematic Government Access,” 253. 
85 Perry et al., Predictive Policing, 13. 
86 Pell, “Systematic Government Access,” 253. 
87 Perry et al., Predictive Policing, 13. 
88 Ibid.  
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After determining the data that should be used and collected, the data must then 
be converted into machine-readable data. This process, known as data fusion, is 
complicated even when only attempting to combine data about things. Data fusion 
becomes significantly more difficult when combining data about people, especially 
information collected from documents like case notes (not all law enforcement officers 
have easy-to-read handwriting). As with the predictive analytics methodology, there are 
several methods for data fusion. The programmer must determine the best method for the 
type of data chosen.89   
Moreover, not only must the programmer choose from a wealth of data, but the 
programmer also must choose the weight that each data set receives. It is important to 
remember that “each algorithm is premised on both an assumption about the proper 
assessment of relevance, and an instantiation of that assumption into a technique for 
(computational) evaluation.”90 Thus, a programmer’s own philosophical views on crime 
may play a role as to which datasets receive more weight.91 There is a long history of 
research on what causes people to commit crime, and which theories the programmer 
opts to follow will change the type of data the programmer chooses to use and the weight 
that each dataset receives within the algorithm.92    
At the end of this complicated process, a computer produces a score that 
represents a risk analysis. However, these assessments will not have the precision of say, 
the supercomputer in Willy Wonka and the Chocolate Factory, which could tell the exact 
location of the golden tickets.93 Rather, the score forecasts the likelihood that a particular 
                                                 
89 For a comprehensive discussion on the various data fusion methods and their complications, see 
Perry et al., Predictive Policing, 89–96. 
90 Gillespie, “The Relevance of Algorithms.” 
91 Ibid. 
92 Perry et al., Predictive Policing, 41–42, 76, 78–79. For example, one study suggests that hotter 
temperature leads to more crime. Other researchers argue that burglars tend to stay within a certain area, 
gang shootings incite retaliatory violence, foreclosures lead to increased crime, and increased traffic 
violations correlate with increased crime. 
93 “Willy Wonka-Golden Ticket Super Computer,” YouTube video, 1:10, from Willie Wonka and the 
Chocolate Factory (1971), posted by mediaFace, March 16, 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-
VujGNQpRjQ. Hopefully, if we ever build such a computer, it will not refuse to give us an answer because 
“that would be cheating.” And hopefully, it will not just give us the answer that will require us to build the 
computer to determine the question like in Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy. 
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person will be involved in crime. It is not a precise measurement but a risk analysis. It is 
therefore a tool that should be used with caution.    
B. MEASURING THE RISK ANALYSIS 
Before using the predictive policing program, the risk analysis must be fully 
analyzed to understand the weaknesses of each algorithm.94  Prison systems have had 
some success in determining the risk that a parolee will commit a crime once released. 
This risk assessment is then used by the parole officer and police to give more attention 
to the parolee.95 One such model developed by Berk assesses the risk that a parolee will 
commit a homicide after he or she is released.96 The accuracy, however, is limited 
because the risk analysis only accurately forecasts about eight future kills out of every 
100.97 Another study attempted to predict school-age boys in Pittsburgh who are more 
likely to be involved in homicide. The study found that it is possible “to predict violence 
in a community sample of boys” with a relatively low false negative error rate of 17.4% 
but a high rate of false positive errors of 86.6%.98 Although the number of boys that 
ultimately were involved in homicide that the study missed was low, the number of those 
incorrectly predicted to be involved in homicides was high. Other metrics have been used 
to assess risk. For example, the Chicago Police Department in 2012, through social 
network analysis methods, showed that individuals who are co-arrested with a homicide 
victim are more likely to be killed as well.99 This work may be proving somewhat 
accurate because the Chicago Police Department claims that so far in 2016, three out of 
four shooting victims were on the Strategic Subject List and 80% of those arrested were 
                                                 
94 It is important to note that each predictive policing program has different weaknesses. The 
differences in data and algorithms create different problems. 
95 Perry et al., Predictive Policing, 92. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Loeber et al., “The Prediction of Violence and Homicide in Young Men,” Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology 73 (2005): 1074–1088. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.483.6423&rep=rep1&type=pdf  
99 Perry et al., Predictive Policing, 99. 
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also on the list.100  However, these metrics were recently called into question by a newly 
released study by Saunders et al.101 The study concluded that individuals are not more or 
less likely to become a victim of a homicide or a shooting than the study’s comparative 
group; however, an individual is more likely to be arrested if he or she is on the list.102   
As these examples show, the metrics to prove the effectiveness of predictive 
analytics programs are squishy. What I mean by this is that one cannot simply assess the 
number of people correctly included but must also assess the number of people 
incorrectly included (formally known as false positives) and those incorrectly excluded 
(formally known as false negatives).103  However, when predicting potential criminals, 
program operators will never know a program incorrectly included someone until that 
person dies without committing a crime. Therefore, it is no surprise that predictive 
policing programs struggle with finding an appropriate metric.104   
Predictive policing programs commonly use the crime rate to measure the 
accuracy of the forecasts, but this may not be an accurate metric.105  First, a crime rate for 
only a specific area will not account for the crime simply moving to a different area 
because of increases in police patrols due to predictive policing. Therefore, at the very 
least, the crime rate must be calculated for an entire jurisdiction. Second, the crime rate 
does not account for the false positives. Incorrectly including people on the list will have 
no effect on a crime rate. And lastly, the crime rate may not account for false negatives 
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either. Most predictive policing programs include an element of added police 
intervention.106 The prevention can include increased patrols, hardening (or better 
protecting) of the potential targets, and increased community contacts.107 Consequently, 
the decrease in crime may not be because of the prediction but rather the increased police 
intervention. Predictive policing needs to find better metrics.     
C. CONTROLLING THE USE OF THE RISK ANALYSIS   
After a predictive policing program chooses a method and data, and measures the 
accuracy of the program, then it must use the assessment. An obvious use is to allocate 
limited resources accordingly. For example, police officers can use assessments to save 
time in investigations by focusing on certain individuals, and parole officers can schedule 
high-risk individuals for more check-ins than low-risk individuals.108 In a time of 
continual belt-tightening, any tool to help departments better focus their resources is 
welcomed, but if predictive policing is used incorrectly, it could waste resources. 
Assessments also can be used in reasonable suspicion or probable cause analysis.109  
However, if a program’s analysis is incorrect, then a police officer may search or seize 
the wrong individual. Therefore, significant civil rights and civil liberties abuses can 
occur if the predictive policing program is not properly controlled. 
Police must ensure that the risk analysis created by the predictive policing 
program is used correctly. It is surprising that given the power the government has to 
make an assessment and decision about a person’s character, there are no laws that 
directly cover predictive analytics use by law enforcement. The Privacy Act governs the 
collection and sharing of data, but it does not govern the analysis of that data. 
Furthermore, the Privacy Act only affects the federal government and does not cover data 
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collected and used by state and local governments and private entities. The Fourth 
Amendment does not fully protect our digital data either.110 Courts are beginning to 
assess predictive programs used in sentencing, however.111 These cases prompted courts 
to create limits and conditions for the proper use of predictive policing. Because 
sentencing requires judges to consider the totality of an individual’s character and 
circumstances, courts may use similar limitations and conditions when analyzing the 
totality of the circumstances for the application of the Fourth Amendment. However, the 
courts, thus far, have not done this.    
With little guidance for predictive policing, how can predictive policing programs 
be sure that they are wielding this powerful tool wisely? In the following sections, I 
analyze two programs that apply predictive analytics, FICO and Secure Flight, in order to 
identify the successes and mistakes of those systems. By learning from other predictive 
analytic programs, predictive policing programs can avoid common mistakes and 
replicate the successes.    
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V. THE FICO SCORE: 
HOW I DISCOVERED THAT THE CREDIT BUREAUS 
THOUGHT I WAS MARRIED TO MY DAD 
A. HISTORY OF CREDIT RISK SCORES 
The FICO score has an interesting history, and in many ways, it illuminates what 
is happening in predictive policing programs. William R. Fair and Earl J. Isaac founded 
Fair, Isaac & Company, Inc., in 1956 as a problem-solving organization.112 The 
company’s first foray into the emerging market of credits cards was to design a billing 
system for Conrad Hilton’s Carte Blanche, which was distributed to the hotel chain’s 
guests. It was from this interaction that Fair and Isaac began to work to assist credit 
providers in selecting their customers, and in 1958, the company installed the first 
commercially produced credit scorecards for American Investment of St. Louis, 
Louisiana.113 
These first scorecards were simple and developed only for the credit provider’s 
particular customer base.114 The customer base became the baseline. The limited baseline 
was necessary for the rudimentary predictive analytics program that Fair, Isaac was 
creating for the first time. The initial question addressed by the rudimentary program was 
limited to whether the credit providers should give credit to the individual. Each company 
received a different scorecard for each city in order to create an appropriate baseline to 
screen consumers within that distinct population.115 In order to create the scorecards, 
Fair, Isaac would send several employees to review the administrative files of that 
particular branch. Based on the historical administrative files, Fair, Isaac would create a 
scorecard that would predict the consumers most likely to repay their debt.116 Of course, 
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the statistical theory was only as good as the data; thus the variety, volume, and veracity 
of data for the particular branch was the foundation of any good predictive scorecard.   
As with any predictive analytics program, the analyst that created each scorecard 
had to make several strategic decisions about the data provided by the branches. The 
analyst had to decide which pieces of data should be included, the correct sampling 
number, and the correct files to include in the sample.117 Once this data was chosen, the 
files were sent to part-time workers, who were often homemakers.118 Much like today, 
this aspect of predictive analytics was not seen as very important. However, the home-
coders who were paid a few cents per sample application, made some incredibly 
important decisions because they made the data usable. The home-coders created what is 
known today as data fusion by interpreting the various documents, including any bad 
handwriting, in order to convert the data into the standardized numerical codes needed for 
the analytic process to be read by machine.119 Because no credit provider used the same 
forms, this work was often an art form in translation.  
After the home-coders turned the information into usable data, the analysts had to 
create the model to process the data. In order to do this, the analysts had to determine the 
amount of weight to put on each dataset in order to receive an accurate forecast on which 
individuals should receive credit.120 The final algorithm was non-transferable because it 
could be applied only to that lender’s business.121 Modern-day credit-score formulas are 
well established. The decisions on what data to include, how to fuse the data, and the 
weight of each dataset has largely been determined; but nearly 60 years ago, designing 
the data set was an art in progress. The current environment of predictive policing is 
comparable to this stage of the FICO score’s creation. 
Fair, Isaac continued to build its business, and in the 1980s, the company began to 
change the data that it relied on to create algorithms. Instead of basing the algorithms on 
117 Ibid., 290. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid., 292. 
121 Ibid. 
 31 
the files from specific lenders, Fair, Isaac began relying on the credit bureaus for the 
data.122 With the ability to rely on a larger swath of consumer data, Fair, Isaac was able 
to develop an algorithm that could be applied nationwide.123 This contemporary FICO 
score significantly changed how credit was given and used by individuals. Instead of 
waiting for a consumer to apply for credit and then evaluating his or her creditworthiness, 
banks and lenders, for the first time, could evaluate the general population of consumers 
and determine who should receive advertising to encourage him or her to apply for credit. 
This opened the door to a much wider market because lenders could now initiate credit 
relationships through advertising.124  
Today, three major U.S. credit agencies, Experian, Equifax, and Transunion, rely 
upon the secret algorithm used for FICO scores.125 And as mentioned above, FICO 
scores are now used for much more than determining creditworthiness. Score creep, as I 
call it, is not necessarily a bad phenomenon, but it makes it that much more important to 
ensure that the score is accurate and accurately used.    
B. LAW 
Unlike most predictive policing programs, FICO scores fall under the purview of 
laws that specifically govern it. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) governs access to 
and maintenance of the information in a credit report.126 The FCRA provides protections 
to consumers, including the right to know if a credit report is used in adverse actions, the 
right to see the credit report (except for credit score), and the right to dispute inaccurate 
information and have that information corrected.127 If a consumer disputes information 
with a creditor, the creditor may not report that information without informing the credit 
bureau of the dispute. Outdated information, which is generally more than seven years 
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old, must be excluded from a credit report.128 The FCRA prohibits anyone other than 
those with a permissible purpose to receive a credit report, and a consumer must give 
written consent to the release of reports to employers or if it includes medical 
information.129 A consumer may also opt to exclude himself or herself from receiving 
unsolicited firm offers of credit or insurance.130 These protections have proven crucial to 
ensure that FICO scores are reliable and do not unfairly hinder a person’s ability to 
receive credit (among the many other uses caused by score creep). 
Despite this extensive statutory scheme designed to make the FICO score more 
reliable, flaws exist that are the subject of proposed legislation.131 The legislation is 
proposed in light of the fact that credit reporting is the number one complaint to the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The complaints range from the cumbersome 
appeals process for correcting inaccurate data to the fact that the consumer bears the 
burden to prove the inaccuracy rather than the credit bureau bearing the burden to prove 
the accuracy.132 The bill would restrict score creep by limiting how employers can use a 
credit score in their hiring practices. Additionally, the bill would add more protections to 
ensure the accuracy of the data, such as removing all paid or settled debts within 45 days 
of settlement, and requiring notification to the consumer the first time a creditor reports 
negative information. Additionally, the bill would allow major lenders to rely on more 
advanced credit scores other than the FICO.133  For example, VantageScore 3.0 
minimizes the effect of medical bills, and other scores include rental information to 
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permit non-homeowners to build better credit.134  These differences highlight the issues 
created by the fact that FICO has not been updated in over decade,135 and show that all 
predictive analytic programs must be continually updated to adapt to the current societal 
trends.  
C. VARIETY AND VOLUME OF DATA 
The FCRA prohibits entities from knowingly providing inaccurate information to 
the credit bureaus or from consciously avoiding knowledge that the information is 
inaccurate. Additionally, these entities must participate in the correction of inaccurate 
data. Although each credit bureau collects slightly different information, the information 
that is included in a credit report generally includes five types of information:136  
• Basic identification information such as name, residential address, date of 
birth, and Social Security number.   
• Information from creditors on loans, leases, and other such bills.   
• Information from public records that pertain to finances, such as bankruptcies 
and foreclosures.  
• Information from collection agencies.  
• Information about individuals or entities that request information from an 
individual’s credit report.  
Although this is a vast amount of information, credit reports are neither 
comprehensive nor complete pictures of the consumer’s’ financial life.137 Some credit 
accounts may not be included; for example, smaller financial companies and some 
government agencies may not report to credit bureaus.138 Additionally, some loans may 
not be included, such as loans from individuals, employers, and foreign entities. Lastly, 
creditors may not quickly inform credit bureaus of changes in accounts, especially closed 
accounts. Creditors, government entities, collection agencies, and other various third-
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party intermediaries voluntarily provide all of the information to the credit bureau.139 The 
bureaus collect information every month and update their records within one to seven 
days.140 Hence, there is a lag in the data reported.   
D. VERACITY OF DATA 
One would assume with the due process protections provided by the FCRA and 
the variety and volume of data relied upon to create the FICO score that it would be easy 
to fulfill the veracity aspect of predictive analytics. However, the data is sometimes 
wrong. After all, the credit bureaus have the incredibly difficult job of producing accurate 
credit reports for everyone. A simple typo in a name or a Social Security number, or a 
consumer’s name change can lead to the addition of information to the wrong credit 
report.141 It is the basic difficulty of any database that is based on biographical 
information as opposed to biometrics. 
FICO still receives its information from the three major American credit bureaus, 
which maintain credit histories on over two hundred million consumers.142 The data 
reported to credit bureaus on consumers comes from more than 30,000 entities.143  From 
this data, the bureaus process about “two billion individual account updates, two million 
new public record items, and 3.3 million changes of address monthly.”144   
Credit bureaus review information they receive for accuracy before including it in 
an individual’s report.145 If the information is found to be inaccurate, the credit bureaus 
returns it to the entity for correction and resubmission. Besides checking for accuracy, the 
credit bureaus must then determine “when to ignore slight variations in personal 
identifying information and … recognize [when] data items with the same identifying 
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information, such as name, may actually be associated with different individuals.”146  
Thus, ensuring that the data is accurate is extremely difficult. Even with all of the various 
steps, credit rating bureaus still hold inaccurate data that can affect an individual’s FICO 
score. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that with that much data to handle and update, the 
information—and consequently, the score—is not 100% correct. Furthermore, many of 
the problems occur when third parties report incorrect information to the credit bureaus. 
Fixing the inaccurate data held by third- and fourth-party providers is out of the control 
of FICO and the credit bureaus.   
Despite these significant issues, the FICO score can, for the majority of 
consumers, predict who within the United States is more likely to repay debts. But for 
some consumers, the data errors within the U.S. credit bureaus can cause significant 
problems. Smith et al. conducted a study that shows the number of individuals who are 
impacted by an inaccurate FICO score. In their study, they sampled 1,000 American 
consumers and reviewed their credit reports from the three bureaus. Out of those studied, 
26% found at least one material error.147 An interesting aspect of their study is that they 
also followed those individuals as they attempted to correct the errors. Only 78% of those 
individuals were able to have at least one bureau alter the information in their credit 
rating.148 This alteration often made significant differences to the credit scores. Their 
conclusion was that credit scores can be a good indicator of creditworthiness, but only if 
consumers are vigilant to ensure that the data included in their score is accurate.149  
Despite the need for vigilance, only about 38% of consumers annually verify their 
information held by the credit bureaus.150 Placing the onus on consumers to ensure the 
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accuracy of the data saves significant resources for the bureaus, but it does not ensure the 
accuracy of the data. Furthermore, it pushes the economic cost onto the consumers 
because the consumers pay higher fees due to the incorrect information.151   
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VI. SECURE FLIGHT: WHY YOUR FRIEND 
ALWAYS GETS PRECHECK FOR FREE 
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the Department of 
Homeland Security created Secure Flight in 2009. At first, the only goal was to identify 
airline passengers who posed a high risk by matching those individuals against federal 
government watch lists.152 In 2011, the program expanded to include lists of pre-
approved low-risk travelers, such as those in the TSA Precheck program. This eventually 
evolved, and now Secure Flight conducts risk analysis for individuals on a per-flight 
basis to determine their general risk to aviation security.153  
It is possible for citizens to know the type of the information used by Secure 
Flight, unlike several state and local predictive policing programs. The Privacy Act of 
1974, as mentioned previously, requires the federal government to maintain a System of 
Records Notice (SORN) for most databases of this type.154 Secure Flight collects data 
from aviation passengers as well as others who enter the secured areas of airports.155  The 
data collected is then used to assess the risk of the passenger on a per-flight basis. If an 
individual matches a watch list, he or she will receive enhanced screening and may be 
prohibited from flying. For all other individuals, the program, through an algorithm, 
conducts a risk-based analysis of the data collected to determine whether the individual is 
a low or moderate risk.156 If the individual is considered a low-risk passenger, then the 
individual is routed to the TSA Precheck line.157 The individuals considered a moderate 
risk use the standard line. Although the Secure Flight risk assessment also is capable of 
determining if an individual is a high risk, the Secure Flight risk assessment is not used to 
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forbid an individual from flying or entering the secure area of an airport. Secure Flight 
only denies an individual the ability to fly if the individual’s name matches to a name on 
the No Fly List.158   
The data used in Secure Flight comes from several databases, including the 
Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS), which assesses passenger 
name records (PNR), and other information contained in flight reservations collected by 
aircraft operators such as  
• the No Fly List;  
• the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB);  
• lists of low-risk individuals, such as TSA Precheck known travelers;  
• frequent flyer designator codes; and  
• other classified and unclassified governmental law enforcement, 
immigration, or intelligence databases.159  
The TSA is also considering the use of commercial databases to verify the 
information provided by airline passengers.160 Data that is not associated with a match to 
a watch list is destroyed within seven days of the flight and is only kept if a passenger 
complains that he or she was wrongly identified under the system.161  
One of the main criticisms against Secure Flight is the lack of performance 
measures to ensure that the program is meeting its goals.162 TSA collects information 
about the number of individuals matched as high or low risk, but it does not keep metrics 
on the extent of matching errors—either false negatives or false positives.163 As of April 
2014, TSA was still developing appropriate metrics to determine this crucial performance 
metric.164 Additionally, as with most predictive analytics programs, there is concern that 
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due process is not adequately protected by Secure Flight, given that many of the 
databases it relies on cannot be checked for accuracy by average citizens.165  
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VII. ANALYSIS: OR THE POINT OF THIS THESIS 
At this point, you may be thinking: So what? Clearly, these are three perfectly 
legitimate and legal uses of predictive analytics. All three greatly help society: FICO 
prevents financial ruin, Secure Flight helps keep the TSA lines shorter and moving faster, 
and predictive policing helps manage law enforcement resources. The key here is to learn 
from the mistakes of these existing programs to improve the planning of new ones. FICO, 
despite being around for a few decades, still has some significant problems, as does 
Secure Flight. Before law enforcement widely begins using predictive policing programs 
to predict what humans might do, the agencies and departments should learn from these 
predictive analytics pitfalls and adjust their programs accordingly. So often, a new tool or 
technology is put into use without fully understanding the bad that comes with the good. 
The lack of understanding can lead to misuse, and misuse can undermine the tool’s 
benefits. This leads to the tool being severely hampered by overly corrective policies or 
being taken away altogether.   
How does a program avoid the aforementioned pitfalls and their likely 
consequences during the establishment of a predictive analytics program? One way is to 
use the Five Vs as a framework to evaluate the effectiveness of the predictive policing 
program. Each program will have strengths and weaknesses when assessed against the 
Five Vs, and by using those elements, predictive policing programs can make an 
assessment of the program. For the purpose of this thesis, it proves useful to compare and 
contrast FICO, Secure Flight, and predictive policing through the Five Vs Framework.      
A. THE FIVE VS  
1. Volume  
As mentioned earlier, the brilliance of big data is that scientists and analysts do 
not need to rely on a small amount of data in order to form a prediction. Long gone are 
the days of creating a sample set of data, similar to the FICO scorecards. Rather, big data 
allows for all data within a dataset to be used and all individuals to be compared to each 
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other. This creates a better baseline to know what is normal behavior to then better detect 
abnormal behavior.   
FICO keeps a credit score for every individual who has some form of credit. Even 
individuals who have never had any form of credit have a score—it is just incredibly low. 
This baseline makes anomalies much easier to detect because everyone who has or needs 
credit is compared against each other. Additionally, FICO can come fairly close to 
collecting all datasets on individuals that may determine whether they will pay their debts 
because FICO focuses only on creditworthiness. However, because FICO and the credit 
bureaus must rely on third parties to accurately and timely report the data, the volume 
needed for an accurate assessment may be incorrect, as is the case if the data is late or 
inaccurate, or if a third party never provides the data.   
Secure Flight attempts to assess individuals as either low or moderate risk in 
terms of potential for sabotaging air flight. That seems like a narrow focus; however, 
there are various datasets that could apply to this determination because there is not an 
exact profile of people who want to sabotage planes. Therefore, the fact that Secure 
Flight mostly limits its datasets to information that is directly related to airline flights 
may be an overly narrow scope for the objective. Additionally, Secure Flight deletes the 
determination and data shortly after the flight finishes. So even though Secure Flight 
collects information on all airline passengers, the lack of a clear profile of terrorists and 
the lack of historical data means that Secure Flight may not have the volume of data 
needed to make an accurate risk assessment. Consequently, Secure Flight may not have 
the correct baseline of data for the algorithm to determine the normal as opposed to the 
abnormal. 
Most predictive policing programs will face similar problems to those 
experienced by Secure Flight because of the inability to determine a proper baseline. A 
multitude of factors can foster an atmosphere that will lead an individual to commit 
crime. The question of who within a society will commit a crime is not a narrow 
question. The predictive program, in order to answer that question, will need to use 
several datasets, depending on which theory of criminology the programmer opts to 
follow. At this point, it is difficult to fully analyze whether predictive programs achieve 
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volume because most of the programs do not release this information. It is considered the 
proprietary information of the private companies that create the programs.166  
However, it is doubtful that any of the predictive policing programs collected 
information on every citizen within its jurisdiction. As uncomfortable as this is to admit, 
in order to create a baseline that effectively determines who is likely to commit a crime, 
programs need to collect information from the whole of the community, much like FICO. 
Arguably, the predictive programs that predict which parolees will be recidivists may 
come closest to a complete baseline. Here, being able to use all datasets of all parolees 
creates a solid baseline because the question to be answered is narrow: Which parolees 
will be recidivists? The question is not asking which citizens will be recidivists. Because 
predictive policing programs that seek to predict who will be involved in crime ask such 
broad questions, the programs need a broad baseline and a large volume of information. 
We, as a society, must determine if the accuracy of a predictive policing program 
is worth the potential tradeoff in privacy. A better baseline will ensure a better risk 
assessment but will require police departments to collect a significant amount of 
information on all citizens. China determined this issue by choosing the more accurate 
baseline over privacy. China directed its largest state-run defense contractor, China 
Electronic Technology Group, to create a program that is capable of assessing each 
citizen’s likelihood of being a terrorist.167 This “united information environment,” as 
China calls it, will collect data on jobs, hobbies, consumption habits, and other various 
data streams.168 This combined with a proposed law that would grant the Chinese 
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government vast access to user data for national security purposes would allow China to 
have a baseline similar to FICO’s baseline for predictive policing purposes.  
2. Variety 
Variety is ensuring that data comes from various sources, which creates a stronger 
baseline for the algorithm to make its prediction. Finding the right balance of sources will 
always be difficult because the more variety, the more likely that the information may be 
inaccurate. Additionally, in order to have variety, the analytic program must persuade a 
third party to hand over its data. Even though there are statutes that encourage entities to 
voluntarily give data to the credit bureaus, FICO still has difficulty gathering the financial 
data from these various sources. Secure Flight also has difficulty with variety because a 
significant portion of the data that Secure Flight relies on is data created and maintained 
by the government. It can be assumed that predictive policing programs will also have 
difficulty with variety.169  
Variety is critical for predictive analytics because it helps to ensure accuracy of 
the data. Additionally, as a predictive analytic assessment is used for more than its 
original use, such as how FICO is used for much more than just creditworthiness, this 
score creep will require a larger variety of data. FICO scores are used to help determine if 
a person should receive a job, is date worthy, is trustworthy, and so on. The score creep 
phenomenon is also affecting some of the data used by Secure Flight because of 
legislation to deny firearms to those who are on the No Fly List.170 Any predictive 
policing program must assume that its risk analysis will eventually be used for more than 
just determining who may be involved in crime. 
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Currently, there is not much one can do to prohibit score creep. Nothing in the 
laws or regulations forbids individuals from basing decisions off of these predictive risk 
assessments. This is especially troubling when one considers that the predictive analytics 
program often only collects data to answer a specific question. Thus, if a program does 
not include enough variety of data to accurately answer the initial question, when score 
creep occurs the prediction will be that much more inaccurate. Because people often 
assume that any assessment that comes from a computer is absolutely accurate, score 
creep must be considered when creating a predictive analytics program. Without the 
proper understanding of the exact predictive question that the algorithm is answering, the 
datasets included, and the acceptable predictive probability, people will use the predictive 
assessment incorrectly.  
3. Velocity 
Not surprisingly, I do not have access to the data processing speeds of FICO, 
Secure Flight, or Predictive Policing programs. Velocity is key because if the data is not 
up to date, even up to the minute, then the algorithm will be inaccurate. In other words, 
the more stale the data, the more stale the prediction.   
The credit bureaus have problems with keeping up-to-date data because reporting 
entities often do not report information in a timely way. This lag time can sometimes help 
consumers, and it can sometimes hurt consumers. Either way, the lag time hurts FICO’s 
accuracy.   
Secure Flight is unique because it draws from several protected datasets as well as 
the databases from private entities (airlines). One of the protected datasets is the No Fly 
List. The process to add a name to the No Fly List is complicated, which creates 
significant lag time. First, the individual must be nominated to the Terrorist Screening 
Database. Then, the Terrorist Screening Center must accept the nomination. If an 
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individual fits certain criteria, he or she is nominated for the No Fly List. TSA then 
reviews and either accepts or rejects the nomination.171   
This process takes time, and depending on your point of view, that can be good or 
bad. It is bad if you want the most up-to-date predictive analytics program because the 
faster the information is included in the algorithm, the faster the computer can learn from 
the data and make necessary adjustments. At the same time, we cannot forget that the 
Terrorist Screening Database and the No Fly List have significant impacts on individuals’ 
lives. Before limiting an individual’s fundamental right to travel or intimating to the law 
enforcement community that someone may be a terrorist, there should be a well-
established and thorough process. Even if Secure Flight’s risk assessment is done by a 
computer, the choice to include someone in several of the databases that feed into Secure 
Flight is a human one, and human decisions are fraught with errors. Consequently, a key 
for predictive policing programs will be to find the balance between maintaining up-to-
date data and ensuring that the data is accurate before it is added to the database. 
4. Veracity 
The errors caused by human decisions play directly into the veracity of the data 
used by predictive analytic programs. In order for a predictive analytics program to make 
accurate predictions, it needs accurate data. Veracity will always be one of the hardest of 
the Vs for any program to achieve. Sometimes, data is incorrectly inputted; other times, a 
person makes an incorrect assumption. Sometimes, data becomes inaccurate with time.   
For a large database, FICO does fairly well ensuring the accuracy of its data, but, 
as was mentioned previously, it still has problems significant enough to warrant proposed 
legislation to fix inaccuracies. This is troubling for predictive policing programs—that 
even a thoroughly transparent predictive analytic program like FICO still experiences 
significant problems with accurate data. Several scholars have called for transparency in 
                                                 
171 Sharon Bradford Franklin and Sarah Holcomb, “Watching the Watch Lists: Maintaining Security 
and Liberty in America,” Human Rights 34 (207): 18, 19; see also Ibrahim v. Dept. of Homeland Security, 
62 F. Supp. 3d 909, 931(D. N. Ca. 2014), noting that an FBI agent incorrectly check the box to nominate 
Ibrahim to the No Fly List.  
 47 
the creation of predictive policing programs,172 but as the inaccuracy issue with FICO 
shows, transparency is not the only answer. A well-defined and effective process to 
correct that data is also necessary. Remember, only 78% of individuals with inaccurate 
data are able to have at least one bureau alter the information in their credit rating.173  
Creating and maintaining this process is where most predictive analytic programs fail.  
Although the Government Accountability Office admonished Secure Flight to 
improve the accuracy of the data it uses, Secure Flight, like FICO, has had difficulties 
with this.174 Transparency with the public is difficult because Secure Flight relies on 
several databases that are not open to public review and critique. Many of these 
databases, like the No Fly List and the Terrorist Screening Database, contain information 
collected for and used in ongoing law enforcement investigations. To allow the public to 
review that data for accuracy would compromise the investigations. The same will hold 
true for some of the data included in predictive policing programs. This creates an 
enormous challenge: the need to balance the secrecy of ongoing investigations with an 
individual’s need and potential due process right to correct inaccurate information about 
them. 
The No Fly List, which feeds into Secure Flight, shows that Secure Flight, like 
FICO, also fails in creating an effective process to correct data. The courts determined 
that the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP) did not meet the 
requirements of due process, and as a result, the courts required DHS to revamp the 
program.175 In other words, DHS has not created an effective process to allow people to 
correct inaccurate data that the No Fly List maintains about them.  
                                                 
172 See, for example, Uchida, A National Discussion on Predictive Policing; Ridgeway, “The Pitfalls of 
Prediction,” noting that one of the seven pitfalls of predictive policing is not focusing on transparency.  
173 Smith et al., “Accuracy of Information Maintained by U.S. Credit Bureaus: Frequency of Errors and 
Effects on Consumers’ Credit Scores,” The Journal of Consumer Affairs (Fall 2013): 594, and 600. 
174 Government Accountability Office, Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but Risks 
Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed (GAO-05-356) (Washington, DC, GAO, March 
2005), 3. 
175 Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp 3d 1134, 1161–62 (D. Or. 2014), finding the TSA redress procedures 
did not meet the constitutional for due process; Ibrahim v. Dept. of Homeland Security, 62 F. Supp. 3d 909, 
931(D. N. Ca. 2014), finding that TSA did not provide constitutional due process to plaintiff. 
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The difficulty of ensuring the veracity of data highlights three significant issues 
with predictive analytics programs. First, governmental and private entities are making 
significant decisions about individuals, but those decisions are largely unreviewable. 
With predictive policing, a police department determines who is likely to be involved in a 
crime or a recidivist, yet those individuals have little redress to challenge those decisions. 
Second, the third- or fourth-party datasets that feed into these programs need review. The 
No Fly List is not part of the Secure Flight program, but the data from the No Fly List is 
used by the algorithm that determines an individual’s risk score. Thus, the redress 
concerns for inaccurate data may flow beyond the initial predictive program. Finally, not 
all datasets that feed into the predictive program will be governed by the same laws. 
FICO is not a government entity; therefore, the Fourth Amendment does not apply. State 
and local law enforcement groups do not need to abide by the Privacy Act, nor do private 
entities that collect a large portion of the data now available. If predictive policing 
programs rely on data from private entities that are not regulated, then significant 
governmental decisions are being made based on unregulated data.   
5. Verification  
Verification, simply put, is testing the predictive analytics program. Without 
verification, the end user—whether governmental or private entities—cannot be sure that 
the forecast made by the predictive analytics program is accurate. Verification requires 
metrics. Without finding the right metrics to measure the predictive analytics program, 
the program runs the risk of making inaccurate predictions.176 The metrics ensure that the 
natural biases of the programmer do not create inaccurate forecasts by either emphasizing 
or deemphasizing certain datasets.177 Additionally, the metrics help the programmer 
know if the data that is being relied upon is accurate. Furthermore, predictive analytics 
are algorithms that need to “learn from their own mistakes” (formally known as machine 
learning). However, if a program is never told when it gets a prediction wrong, the 
program cannot learn and correct itself. Metrics are also required in order to set an 
                                                 
176 Siegel, Predictive Analytics, 79. 
177 Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery; for further discussion, see Gillespie, “The 
Relevance of Algorithms.”  
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acceptable rate of false negatives and false positives. No matter how accurate the 
algorithm or the data every predictive analytic program will make a wrong prediction 
because humans do not always follow the norms.178  However, without accurate metrics, 
the programmer cannot determine the percentage of false positives and negatives and 
cannot adjust the algorithm accordingly.       
It is easier to measure some predictive analytic programs than others. FICO, for 
example, is one of the easier programs to verify because once someone receives a credit 
score, either they act according to that score or they do not. So, assuming the FICO 
scores are accurate, someone who has a low score will not repay their loans as often as 
someone who has a high score. If the prediction does not occur, the algorithm can 
analyze the wrong predictions and make adjustments as necessary. Secure Flight is an 
example of a predictive analytics program that is difficult to measure. Secure Flight 
determines who is a low-risk passenger, and then he or she can go through the Precheck 
line instead of the normal security line. In one sense, Secure Flight can measure its 
accuracy because no one has gone through the Precheck line that intended to bring 
dangerous items on the airplane. But just because something has not occurred, does not 
mean Secure Flight’s assessments have been verified. There are probably a number of 
people who were sent to the normal security line who should have gone to the Precheck 
line. In order to know if Secure Flight assessments are correct, the program must prove a 
negative, which is extremely difficult to do.179   
Predictive policing programs will find themselves in much the same predicament 
as Secure Flight. It will be extremely difficult for Chicago to know if one of the 400 
people on its heat list will never be involved in a violent crime because that would require 
actually predicting the future.180 A parole board that chooses to deny someone parole will 
never know if that individual would have been a recidivist if released from jail. 
Consequently, police departments need to recognize that a crucial element of predictive 
                                                 
178 Siegel, Predictive Analytics, 79. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Chicago could follow the individuals until they die. However, that would be an extremely long 
study with severe implications on civil rights, civil liberties and privacy of the innocent individuals.   
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analytics—machine learning—will not occur in many predictive policing programs 
without viable metrics. Without machine learning, the algorithm will not be able to adjust 
to changing crime trends. With no ability to verify the predictions, there is no way to 
know whether the people the departments target are actually bad guys or just victims of 
police harassment  
Only relying on a drop in crime rate does not verify that the predictive analytics 
made a correct forecast. Take, for example, the Greater Manchester Police’s pilot 
program using predictive policing. The burglary rate dropped by 26.6% during the period 
of review. However, during this period, the police assisted in “hardening” 250 properties, 
and contacted 416 property owners face-to-face.181  The Manchester Police relied on the 
forecast to determine which properties to harden, which arguably saves police and 
community resources, but any property that is hardened is less likely to be burgled. Thus, 
the decrease in burglary rate may have only been caused by the increase in police 
activity.  
Furthermore, the pilot only focused on the Greater Manchester area. Therefore, 
while the burglary rates for that area did decrease, the burglary rates for the adjacent area 
may have increased.182 In a sense, by making a forecast and focusing police resources the 
predictive analytics program may then become wrong. It is like a kind of “Butterfly 
Effect.”183 As soon as the prediction is acted upon and the police refocus their resources, 
the criminals do, as well. This is why good metrics to feed into machine learning is 
incredibly important for predictive policing programs. At this point in predictive 
analytics, there is not an analytic program with fast enough machine learning to handle 
these quick and subtle shifts. Because just as law enforcement is being revolutionized by 
technology, so is crime.184  
The recent study of the Chicago Police Department’s predictive policing program 
also shows that only relying on crime rate is not enough. The report, which studied the 
                                                 
181 Newbold, “ ‘Predictive Policing,’ ‘Preventative Policing,’”13. 
182 Newbold, “ ‘Predictive Policing,’ ‘Preventative Policing,’” 13. 
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 51 
data from 2013, showed that an individual on the list was not more or less likely to be 
involved in homicide than the comparative group, but an individual on the list was more 
likely to be arrested.185 The report proposed that the higher arrest rate could be because 
police officer used the list as leads, but notes that the higher arrest rate does raise 
significant “privacy and civil rights considerations that must be carefully considered, 
especially for predictions that are targeted at vulnerable groups at high risk of 
victimization.”186   Therefore, predictive policing programs must work to find viable 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The most obvious, yet most likely forgotten, approach to the challenges facing 
predictive policing programs is to understand that using predictive analytics to predict 
human behavior is a relatively new technology that still has bugs in it. These programs 
need to train police officers fully on the limitations of the predictions. The training should 
include an understanding of the data relied upon, and the number of false negatives and 
false positives that the system tends to forecast. Without this thorough understanding, 
police officers will easily misuse the forecast.   
A. SELF-POLICING 
The first step in ensuring a reliable program is to thoroughly vet the data. Even 
though there are proprietary concerns because most of the programs are created by the 
private sector, the law enforcement department needs full knowledge of the datasets 
being used and which third or fourth parties provided the data. Even if full transparency 
cannot be given to the public because of proprietary concerns or law enforcement 
concerns, the department must have full transparency into how the predictive policing 
program was created and is maintained. 
Not only must the program ensure that the data is accurate but the predictive 
policing programs must set up viable redress programs as soon as the program is put in 
place. The programs will not be able to provide transparency due to law enforcement 
sensitive information, but having a viable and robust redress program will demonstrate to 
the public that the program can still be trusted. Additionally, the redress programs will 
make the assessments stronger. If there is incorrect data, it needs to be corrected so that 
police resources are not wasted targeting the wrong people.    
The police department must also create clear metrics to measure the system. 
Currently, the main metric used to measure if a predictive policing program works is a 
reduction in crime rate, but, as mentioned earlier, this may not be an accurate metric. 
Rather, I think A/B Testing would be more beneficial. A/B Testing is often used to test 
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which version of an app or website is better liked by potential clients.187 Both versions 
are launched, data is collected, and by comparing the data, determinations can be made 
about which version was more productive. For predictive policing, it can be done by 
using predictive policing in comparing groups of people, similar to the Saunders study in 
the Journal in Experimental Criminology. The data is then collected, and the various 
areas can be compared to one another. Therefore, the status quo is measured against the 
predictive policing effects. If the predictive policing remains the same to the status quo, 
then predictive policing has not added anything. Tests would need to be tailored to each 
jurisdiction, but it seems to be the only way to find a true metric that could possibly prove 
the negative because at least with A/B Testing, the program will be accurately measured 
against the status quo. Additionally, the recently released study on Chicago’s predictive 
policing program shows promise for finding viable metrics. The Saunders study used 
two-quasi experimental methods—an interrupted time-series analysis and propensity 
score analysis.188 The study shows that using the two methods in combination gives a fair 
overview to the effect that the predictive policing program actually had on a given 
jurisdiction.  
B. LEGAL MATTERS 
Besides self-policing, there can be some changes in laws that will help the 
accuracy of  predictive policing programs. Predictive policing programs are just one more 
technology advancement that shows that the Privacy Act of 1974 needs to be amended to 
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better fit today’s technology.189 One basic requirement should be that the Privacy Act be 
extended to cover states and private entities in their collection of data. As databases 
become interoperable and more integrated, the imaginary line between private, federal, 
and state and local data collections will disappear. In order to have any hope of personal 
data being protected, the protections must extend to any entity that may collect data. 
By thoughtfully researching, creating, and implementing a predictive policing 
program, police departments could harness an extremely powerful tool to better allocate 
resources and keep the streets safer. However, if departments do not fully understand the 
programs they implement, then these programs could waste police resources and make 
the streets less safe. As such, a police department must ensure that the predictive policing 
algorithm used relies on the proper volume and variety of data, and is updated in a timely 
a fashion (velocity). Furthermore, the department must ensure that the data that the 
algorithm relies on stays accurate (veracity). Finally, the police department must 
continually test the veracity of the risk assessments made by the predictive policing 
programs to ensure the risk assessments are accurate.  
  
                                                 
189 There are several theories on how the Privacy Act of 1974 should be updated. Although interesting, 
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